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Abstract
Background: Pay for performance schemes are increasingly being implemented in low income countries to
improve health service coverage and quality. This paper describes the context within which a pay for performance
programme was introduced in Tanzania and discusses the potential for pay for performance to address health
system constraints to meeting targets.
Method: 40 in-depth interviews and four focus group discussions were undertaken with health workers, and
regional, district and facility managers. Data was collected on work environment characteristics and staff attitudes
towards work in the first phase of the implementation of the pilot. A survey of 75 facilities and 101 health workers
were carried out to examine facility resourcing, and health worker employment conditions and job satisfaction.
Results: Five contextual factors which affect the implementation of P4P were identified by health workers: salary
and employment benefits; resource availability, including staff, medicines and functioning equipment; supervision;
facility access to utilities; and community preferences. The results suggest that it is important to consider contextual
issues when implementing pay for performance schemes in low income settings. It highlights the importance of
basic infrastructures being in place, a minimum number of staff with appropriate education and skills as well as
sufficient resources before implementing pay for performance.
Conclusion: Health professionals working within a pay for performance scheme in Tanzania were concerned about
challenges related to shortages of resources, limited supplies and unfavourable community preferences. The P4P
scheme may provide the incentive and means to address certain constraints, in so far as they are within the control
of providers and managers, however, other constraints will be harder to address.
Keywords: Paying for performance, Health system, Contextual factors, Health workers motivation, Low income
countries
Background
The majority of low income countries are far off target
to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 4
and 5; only 31% are on track to meet the child health
MDG4 and 9% the maternal health MDG5 [1]. Invest-
ments in strategies to help countries reach these targets
through increased coverage of quality health services are
increasing. Pay for performance (P4P) has been identi-
fied as one of these strategies. P4P schemes provide fi-
nancial incentives to health care providers that are tied
to the achievement of service coverage and/or quality im-
provements [2]. P4P generally involves intense perform-
ance monitoring, improvements to health information
systems and greater financial autonomy for providers and
increased accountability within the health system [3].
The overall assumption is that P4P will motivate health
workers and their managers to increase productivity and
quality of care, and ultimately strengthen the health sys-
tem [3,4]. Whilst an appropriate incentive package is es-
sential for the success of P4P schemes, it has been argued
that the environment in which it is implemented is also
critical, ideally featuring clear governance structures pro-
moting participation and planning at all levels, sustained
and supportive management and supervision systems as
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well as the availability of appropriate equipment, essential
medicines and other medical supplies [5,6].
In 2013, over 30 low and middle income countries were
implementing P4P schemes, with around half of these in
Africa [7]. Yet, evidence on the impact of P4P on access to
quality health care in low and middle income countries is
still limited; positive effects have been reported in Rwanda
and Congo [8,9] whilst no effects or negative effects were
observed in Burundi and Uganda [10,11]. Evidence of P4P
effects on health workers’ motivation and professionalism
is also scarce [11]. Furthermore, the methodological qual-
ity of studies is often poor [12]. Importantly, there has
been limited research into the context in which P4P
schemes have been implemented and there is a poor un-
derstanding of how the context may affect P4P implemen-
tation and overall effectiveness.
Against this background, this paper describes the con-
text within which a P4P programme was introduced in
Tanzania and discusses the potential for P4P to address
system constraints to meeting targets.
Methods
Study setting
Tanzania is a low income country with gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita (PPP) of $1,775 USD, where
total health expenditure accounts for 7% of GDP [13].
Officially, P4P was launched in January 2011 in Pwani
region of Tanzania (Figure 1). However, the training, that
informed health workers about the content of the
scheme, was not done until the second half of 2011 and
the first payments were made in the first quarter of
2012. A couple of years prior to the start of the scheme,
the government launched a national P4P programme,
but this was never fully implemented, meaning health
workers are less likely to have changed their behavior in
response to the scheme until the first payment was
made. Therefore, although health workers were aware of
the scheme, they only started to respond to the scheme
in the second quarter of 2012. The scheme is imple-
mented by the Tanzanian Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare, with technical assistance from the Clinton
Health Access Initiative and financial support from
the Government of Norway. All facilities (public, private
and faith-based) providing reproductive and child health
(RCH) services in Pwani were eligible to participate
in the pilot. A series of maternal and child health ser-
vices including, for example, institutional deliveries, and
provision of two doses of Intermittent Preventive Treat-
ment (IPT) for malaria during antenatal care are incenti-
vised by the scheme [14]. 75%-90% of facility bonuses
are paid to health workers with the remainder going to
facility strengthening (drug, supply purchase or minor
renovation). Bonus payments account for approximately
10% of the average monthly salaries for RCH workers. In
addition, district and regional staff are eligible for bonus
payments subject to the performance of the facilities in
their district and region and timely and complete com-
pilation of reports. Fund pay-outs are administered by
Figure 1 Regions in Tanzania. Pwani is in the eastern part of the country. Source: Gregor Aisch on Wikimedia Commons with full permission
of usage.
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the National Health Insurance Fund, and made every six
months based on performance in the previous cycle.
Study design
Process and impact evaluations of the P4P programme
were carried out. As part of the process evaluation, data
was collected from a sample of districts over three time
points during the life time of the pilot [14]. Here we
present the findings from the first round of qualitative data
collected from December 2011 to March 2012. We report
findings from in-depth interviews and focus group discus-
sions with health workers, and regional, district and facility
managers on their perceptions of the environment in
which P4P was introduced and its influence on implemen-
tation. Qualitative findings presented are supplemented by
results from facility and health worker surveys carried out
in January 2012, as part of the evaluation of the impact of
P4P on service use and quality.
Five out of the seven intervention districts were sam-
pled for qualitative data collection, including peri-urban
and rural districts and a remote island. Three health fa-
cilities participating in the pilot were purposively se-
lected from each of the five districts to ensure
representation of each level of care and ownership type
(public, faith-based and private), with a total sample of
15 facilities (6 dispensaries, 4 health centers and 5 hospi-
tals; 13 government owned facilities, one faith-based and
one private). Interviews were conducted with health
workers (n = 27), and with district managers (n = 13).
Focus group discussions were held with Health Facility
Governing Committee members responsible for facility
resource management, from three government facilities
and with regional managers.
Qualitative data was collected by four Tanzanian social
scientists working in pairs at the time of the first cycle
of payment. Interviews were conducted in Kiswahili and
tape recorded. Audio tapes were transcribed and trans-
lated into English by the researchers who conducted the
interviews. Data was entered and analysed in Nvivo 9
using thematic content analysis.
A survey of 75 facilities and 101 health workers were
carried out in Pwani region. Of the 75 sampled facilities,
the majority were dispensaries (71%), followed by health
centres (21%) and hospitals (8%). The majority of facilities
(83%) were owned by the government, 12% by faith based
institutions and 5% were parastatal/military facilities.
Most of the health workers interviewed (71%) were fe-
male and just above half (53%) had college level education
or above. The sample of health workers was roughly equally
distributed between clinical cadres (44%) and nursing
cadres (45%) with the remainder being paramedical cadres.
The survey measured basic service provision within the
facility (staffing levels, opening hours, facility management,
as well as facility infrastructure, drug and equipment
availability) in the 12-month period before P4P was imple-
mented. Availability of equipment was based on provider
recall. Availability of drugs and supplies was based on re-
view of the drug register/stock cards at facilities.
Facilities were sampled from those that were eligible
to participate in the scheme and included all eligible
hospitals, health centres and non-public dispensaries.
Public dispensaries were sampled at random with prob-
ability proportional to the number of public dispensaries
in a given district. The health worker survey measured
the P4P effects on providers’ working conditions and at-
titudes towards work at the selected facilities. Health
workers were sampled at random from each facility from
those who were on duty at the facility on the day the in-
terviewers were present. Data was collected from facility
staff members by 8 teams of 7 interviewers and 1 super-
visor. Data was collected using Samsung Galaxy devices
(health worker survey) and on paper (facility survey).
Data was analysed using Stata 12. Ethical approval was
received from the Ifakara Health Institute institutional
review board approval number: 1BI1IRB/38 and the ethics
committee of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical
Medicine. Written informed consent was obtained from
all respondents.
Results
During qualitative interviews, health workers identified
five contextual factors related to the implementation of
P4P: 1) salary and employment benefits; 2) resource avail-
ability, including staff, medicines and functioning equip-
ment; 3) supervision; 4) facility access to utilities, and 5)
community preferences or attitudes.
Salary and employment benefits
Results from the health worker survey reveal that the aver-
age monthly salary of health workers was 570,763 ($357
USD) Tanzanian Shillings (sd = 911,496) ($570 USD) and
that only 7% of interviewed health workers were satisfied
with their current salary. This situation may have been the
result of unpaid worked overtime as health workers re-
ported working 74 hours per week (sd = 50) whilst being
contracted for an average of 62 hours (sd = 53) (Table 1).
Delays in receiving salaries were commonly mentioned,
with more than one third of respondents reporting an aver-
age of five days (sd = 5.5) delays for the month preceding
the survey. More than one quarter (27%) of respondents
also reported having another source of income (Table 1).
The qualitative interviews revealed that overtime pay-
ments and travelling allowances were not paid due to
lack of resources.
“Shortage of budget affects us in the sense that … we
cannot pay entitlements to our staff, for instance we
have not been able to pay on-call allowances and
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working overtime for about six months which is very
de-moralizing”.
In-charge in a health centre, February 2012
“These files here [points at files on the table] are
claims for extra duties and travelling allowances…
Staff haven’t been paid. … if a whole year passes
without [staff] being paid they get demoralized”.
Council manager, January 2012
Resource availability: staff, medicines and functioning
equipment
The facility survey disclosed that the availability of clin-
ical and nursing staff was below the government stipu-
lated norms at most of the primary level facilities visited
(Table 2). Less than 20% of primary level facilities had
the required number of clinical staff (19% of health cen-
tres, 11% of dispensaries); 25% of health centres and
30% of dispensaries had the required number of nurses.
The qualitative interviews indicated that shortage of clin-
ical and nursing cadres in primary level facilities may have
led to paramedical and other staff sometimes stepping in
to deliver services, despite a lack of training to do so.
“Sometimes you find yourself being alone providing
services in the facility. Therefore it is very difficult to
perform the work perfectly the way we learned.
Sometimes you are forced to be a “doctor”, which you
did not get training for … but it [the shortage of
professional staff] forces you to do that”.
Health worker in a dispensary, January 2012
Drug stock outs were common at facilities: over a
quarter of facilities surveyed (27%) reported stock outs
of intermittent preventive treatment (IPT) in the 90 days
preceding the survey and 70% reported stock outs of
anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) (Table 2). Only one third of
health workers surveyed said they were satisfied with the
availability of medicines, and less than one quarter (22%)
with medical supplies (Table 3).
Concerns about drug shortages were voiced during
qualitative interviews:
“Another challenge is the shortage of drugs. This [the
shortage of drugs] makes us fail, during the exercise of
pay for performance. Many drugs are not available in
the health facilities… SP [Sulfadoxine/pyrimethamine]
malaria pills were not available and they are
important in meeting the pay for performance targets".
District manager, January 2012
One reason for drug shortages mentioned by several in-
terviewees was a weakness in the operation of the domestic
drug distribution chain, resulting in insufficient quantities
of drugs being delivered, and sometimes a mismatch be-
tween what was ordered and what was received.
Table 1 Working hours, salary and benefits for health
workers
Variable (n = 101) Mean Standard deviation
Number of working hours contracted
per week, Mean [SD]
62 53
Number of working hours worked last
week, Mean [SD]
74 50
Monthly net salary in Tsh, Mean [SD] 570,763 911,487
Received salary payment with delays, % 36
Number of days salary payment were
delayed last month, Mean [SD]
5 5
Satisfied with salary, % 7
Satisfaction with employment benefits, % 21
Satisfaction with living allowances, % 27
Has other job/activity with income, % 27
Table 2 Facilities resources in the baseline survey
Resources (n = 75) %
Staffing: percentage of facilities meeting the ministry’s norms:
Clinical staff
Hospitals 5
Health centres 3
Dispensaries 6
Nursing staff:
Hospitals NA
Health centres 4
Dispensaries 16
Paramedical staff:
Hospitals NA
Health centres 10
Dispensaries 35
Utilities:
Electricity 69
Water 73
Toilet 97
Stock Outs (% facilities reporting in past 90 days)
Intermittent Preventive Treatment (IPT) 27
Anti-retroviral drugs (ARV) 70
Functioning Equipment
Facilities reporting broken equipment 29
Facilities reporting broken equipments disrupted service delivery 12
Note: NA = data not available.
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“The problem is with the MSD [Medical Store
Department]. You may receive a drug kit, but within
the drug kit you find some items are missing. For
example, you may have ordered 10 items but you only
receive 8 items, the rest is missing, yet the money has
been paid and will not be refunded. You will have to
wait for the missing drugs to come with the next order,
but you can’t be sure ….”
District manager, January 2012
“You’ll find that the doctor orders the drugs we want
but the problem is with the person who packs them -
this person does not necessarily pack the drugs that
we require. For instance, now we have rains and we
expect to get a lot of diarrhoea and malaria cases so
the doctor orders these drugs but …they may not be
supplied. The people who pack the drugs should pack
according to the doctor’s request and not their own
wish to see their stock to be finished. [It is like] you
ordered shoes and the supplier sends you socks - would
you sign and say; that ok, I am taking these socks?”
Health Facility Governing Committee member,
December 2011
Lack of equipment or report of broken equipment was
commonly noted. Forty percent of facilities reported
broken equipment and 52% indicated that this disrupted
the provision of services. Only 17% of health workers
interviewed reported being satisfied with the availability
of functioning equipment (Table 3). During qualitative
interviews, the poor quality of furniture in the labour
ward was also mentioned:
“… the mattresses that are used at the labour-ward
are also used in the general ward. You know the
covers used on those mattresses have the tendency to
allow water to penetrate and so after delivery even
if the blood will be wiped some will penetrate. The
mattresses usually stink and produce a very foul smell”.
Health Facility Governing Committee member,
December 2011
District level managers were concerned about the im-
pact of this situation on staff motivation and retention.
“Frankly speaking, the performance is not good. This is
due to the infrastructure and working equipment
problems. Therefore, people have no morale of work.
You are used to seeing various instruments when you
are at the university, but you find nothing when you
come to work. It de-motivates people in performing
their duties – we lack working equipment, and if it is
available it is outdated”.
District manager, December 2011
“You allocate new staff to the facilities but after one
year they move away. The doctors come here and soon
find out that even though the equipment is here, it is
of low quality … so they leave”.
District manager, December 2011
Just above half of the health workers interviewed said
they were glad to work in their facility rather than another
facility in the country and 43% reported being satisfied
with their own ability to provide high quality of care given
the current working conditions. However, 85% said the
job made them feel good about themselves (Table 3).
During qualitative interviews, some respondents ad-
vised that prior to implementing P4P it would be prefer-
able to ensure the availability of necessary equipment to
enable health workers to complete basic tasks.
“…they [decision makers] could bring equipment and
then start to implement the program. From there you
can start to assess the person. But you haven’t given
the person the equipment and still you want to
evaluate him/her. If you haven’t given him/her
anything he/she will tell you that I can’t do this
because I don’t have equipment…”
Health worker in a hospital, January 2012
Supervision
About two thirds (62%) of health workers interviewed
during the survey said they had an internal supervision,
with 78% reporting their internal supervisor to be the fa-
cility in-charge (Table 4). Most (85%) health workers
said that the last internal supervision took place within
the last month. Nearly all (96%) health workers reported
having an external supervisor, most commonly a mem-
ber of the Council Health Management Team. External
Table 3 Health workers satisfaction with their work and
working conditions
Variable (n = 100) %
Satisfied with medicines availability 33
Satisfied with medical supplies availability 22
Satisfied with functioning equipment availability 17
Satisfied with physical condition of the facility 38
Satisfied with own ability to provide high quality care given current
working condition
43
Glad to work in the facility 51
Job makes me feel good about myself 85
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supervision visits were reported to be less frequent than
internal ones (Table 4).
According to the qualitative data one of the obstacles
for providing more frequent supervision visits was a lack
of financial resources:
We do supervision every quarter. Our plan is to do
supervision monthly but due to limited budget we
haven’t yet done this.
Council health manager and P4P focal person, January
2012
This was confirmed by a facility in-charge:
Now they [external supervisors] have reduced the
frequency of supportive supervision because they do
not have fuel to run the cars. They complain that they
have been requesting fuel from the DED [District
Executive Director] without any success.
Facility in-charge in a health centre, December 2011
Furthermore, some of the interviewees perceived the
quality of external supervision to be poor, as one health
centre in-charge phrased it:
They [external supervisors] do come for supervision,
but to me supervision is about checking how the job
goes and to make corrections … but that kind of
supervision I haven’t seen … they only come to collect
reports. …I haven’t seen them giving us any feedback
on how we are doing…
In-charge in a health centre, January 2012
This situation was also reported by health workers
during the survey with 39% of external supervisors
reported to check records whilst only 3% gave consultations
(Table 4).
Facility infrastructure and utilities
Of all health workers surveyed, less than 40% reported
being satisfied with the physical condition of the facility
(Table 3). The facility survey revealed that over 30% of
facilities had no electricity (Table 2). During qualitative
interviews, facilities without access to electricity were
said to rely on gas supplied by the district, notably to
refrigerate vaccines. However, the health facility survey
revealed that nearly half of facilities reported stock outs
of gas for cold storage of vaccines (data not shown). This
was believed to be mainly due to limited funding from
the central government and transport problems at the
district level.
“… the health facility is using gas containers and to fill
those containers depends on funds from the district
(Council Health Management Team), whereby the
district depends on funding from the government. Now
it’s a long time since we last got those funds … and it’s
a long time now since they [named facility] have given
out any immunizations”.
District manager, January 2012
Access to clean water was also limited; 27% of facilities
did not have access to running water according to the
surveyed facilities whilst nearly all (97%) had toilet facil-
ities, however, only 35% reported having a flush toilet.
Limited waste disposal facilities and lack of water and
electricity was also highlighted during the in-depth
interviews.
“we also have no place to dump the placenta. We
normally dump it into the toilet. We have a problem
with water … it is too far from here to the water hole,
we have to fetch water from a well. … Let them [the
government] think about our facility needs, we don’t
have water and we need energy here, they might
connect the solar …. we use hand-lamps to serve
patients during night hours”.
Health worker in a dispensary, January 2012
Community preferences
A further issue highlighted by health workers during
qualitative interviews was community preferences or
attitudes towards the formal health care system. This was
reported to apply more to areas where educational levels
were thought to be low and perceived to lead to a limited
understanding of pregnant women needs for professional
assistance. This situation, which is beyond the control of
health workers, was believed to potentially affect the
ability to attain the P4P targets:
Table 4 Supervision at health facilities
Variable (n = 101) %
Staff with internal supervisor 62
Internal supervisor is the in-charge 78
Received last internal supervision in past 30 days 85
Staff with external supervisor 96
External supervisor is Council Heath Management Team member 81
Received last external supervision in past 30 days 52
External supervisor - check records 39
External supervisor - consultation 3
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“… it depends on where you are working … if you are
serving people who have education it is very simple.
But here the level of education … is low. We are trying
to give them [health care users] health education but
things remain the same. For example, the issue of
pregnant mothers to deliver at the hospital is becoming
a problem. Many pregnant women do attend a clinic
but when it comes to the stage of delivering they don’t
come to deliver at the facility - they deliver at home.
This is due to local superstition … we try to educate
them, but still nothing has changed. One of the P4P
indicators is that pregnant women have to deliver in a
health facility – but this is difficult to achieve. It is
also difficult to achieve the PV0 [first polio vaccine]
vaccination, as one of the P4P indicators - the PV0 is
supposed to be offered immediately after the baby is
delivered but we cannot do that when the baby is
delivered at home”.
Health worker in a health centre, December 2012
Discussion
This study identified five categories of contextual char-
acteristics affecting the implementation of P4P, including
salary and employment benefits, resource availability,
supervision, facility access to utilities, and community
attitudes. Firstly, the work load on staff is considerably
higher than they are contracted for, which is not reflected
in the remuneration; payments are delayed and overtime
and eligible allowances are not always paid causing demo-
tivation among staff. Secondly, the majority of primary
level facilities do not have the required number of clinical
staff. The reasons for staff shortages are multiple including
unequal distribution between urban and rural areas [15];
the ongoing effects of a recruitment freeze in public sector
workers in the 1990s, and limited capacity of training
schools [16]. One of the consequences of insufficient staff
members is that staff can be forced to take on work they
are not trained for. Thirdly, external supervision providing
consultancy is limited and feedback given to health
workers is scarce. Fourthly, basic utilities are commonly
missing such as electricity and running water. Fifthly, the
community preferences are sometimes unfavourable for
health workers to attain the P4P goals. The study therefore
suggests that it is important to consider contextual issues
when implementing P4P schemes in low income settings.
It highlights the importance of basic infrastructure being
in place, a minimum number of staff with appropriate
education and skills as well as sufficient resources.
Health worker shortages are a commonly acknowl-
edged problem in Africa but P4P can be expected to im-
prove the supply of health workers. A study in Belize
found an increase in nurse density resulting from a na-
tional health insurance scheme with inbuilt performance
contracts [17]. Health workers low satisfaction with sal-
aries and employment benefits has been reported in
other studies undertaken in Tanzania [18,19]. This has,
to some extent, been seen as being responsible for hu-
man resource shortages in rural areas especially for clin-
ical and nursing cadre at primary care levels [15,20]. P4P
has the potential to improve health workers’ motivation,
by increasing financial benefits. In the case of Tanzania
the bonus payments have accounted for around 10% of
health workers average monthly salaries. Higher poten-
tial earnings may make a rural posting more desirable
for health workers, if the additional earnings will offset
the loss in earnings from employment in an urban set-
ting and the more constrained working conditions [21].
Overtime levels were high among surveyed health
workers, which is consistent with other studies in
Tanzania [22], yet payment for overtime could not be re-
lied upon. By providing facilities with additional funding
it is conceivable they may be better able to pay overtime
and other allowances. However, P4P also has the poten-
tial to increase hours worked if utilisation levels increase
and workers have limited spare capacity. Time spent on
reporting on performance indicators could represent a
significant additional time burden.
High rates of drug stock outs and lack of functioning
equipments were identified at baseline consistent with
findings from facilities elsewhere in Tanzania [23,24].
Similar issues have also been reported elsewhere [25,26].
This affects the possibility for health workers to reach
P4P targets as some of the targets are related to provid-
ing drugs or vaccines that are out of stock. This further
leads to health workers’ dissatisfaction, something which
has also been reported elsewhere [27]. Although P4P im-
plementation in Rwanda was in many ways successful,
weak facility infrastructure was also found to constrain
P4P implementation there [26].
The shortage of drugs is mainly a result of limitations
in the central procurement system through the Medical
Stores Department (MSD), which supplies drugs to
government and non-public facilities. Specifically delays
in delivering drugs, a mis-match between drugs ordered
and those delivered and stock outs of drugs at the central
MSD warehouse have been noted [28]. Although the P4P
scheme would not be able to affect the central procure-
ment system, the P4P funds could theoretically alleviate
the drug shortage problem if they were used to purchase
drugs and supplies from private suppliers. However,
facilities require permission from the district council to
do so. Similarly certain aspects of facility infrastructure
might be improved using P4P resources, such as pur-
chasing new mattresses, or undertaking minor renova-
tion work. Lack of availability of basic utilities such as
electricity and running water may be less easy to
overcome.
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One of the major concerns in relation to P4P is sus-
tainability but in this case the scheme is funded by the
Norwegian government. However, the implementation
of P4P might stimulate the generation of resources to in-
crease sustainable funds available to health care services.
If health care services can be improved with a P4P
scheme it could help encouraging community enrolment
in the Community Health Fund (CHF), which is a volun-
tary health insurance scheme for people employed in the
informal sector that do not pay tax and have no insur-
ance coverage from their employer. Health workers may
also be more motivated to enrol patients in the CHF as
part of the CHF revenue goes to the facilities serving the
CHF members and can be used to purchase essential
drugs and other supplies in order to perform better. It is
also possible that facilities increase user charges which
would generate additional revenue but could also serve
to reduce access among the poorest. A study in Congo
reported a 25% increase in user fees following the intro-
duction of a P4P scheme [29].
This research raises the question as to whether those
facilities with better baseline resourcing and conditions
are better able to meet targets [30]. This question will be
addressed during forthcoming outputs of this research.
P4P is based on the assumption that health workers re-
spond rationally to incentives, notably monetary rewards
combined with additional funds allocated to facilities;
more intense supervision and improved information
system. Hence, P4P is assumed to increase health workers
motivation to reach targets (extrinsic motivation). How-
ever, other factors, which can be related to intrinsic motiv-
ation also play a role, such as stimulating health workers
confidence, give them feedback and allow them to par-
ticipate in policy making and planning [5,31,32]. Fur-
thermore, it is recognized that P4P-like interventions,
with contingent rewards, also have the potential to
negatively influence health workers’ intrinsic motivation
- if, for instance, health workers perceive they cannot
reach targets because of factors outside their control or
if they perceive that the reward system is unfair [33,34].
Continued monitoring of the Tanzanian P4P pilot will
improve our understanding of the complexities of
health worker motivation and by which process and
pathways P4P affects motivation.
Conclusion
Health professionals working within a pay for performance
scheme in a low income setting are concerned about chal-
lenges related to systemic constraints, shortages of re-
sources, weak infrastructure and unfavourable community
preferences and attitudes. They are concerned that these
weaknesses can affect their performance negatively and
that they might possibility be an obstacle for them to at-
tain their targets. The implementation of the P4P scheme
in Pwani region in Tanzania may provide the incentive
and means to address certain constraints, in so far as they
are within the control of providers and managers, how-
ever, other constraints will be harder to address.
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